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Preface 
During my early studies of Roman history I became 
intrigued with the question of whether the ancients attempted 
to control their economy or whether they merely reacted to 
the changes as they occurred. To me, ancient sources seem 
to focus primarily on political and military aspects of 
history. 
In this work I will attempt to discover whether Julius 
Caesar showed a systematic plan of action in dealing with 
the economy of the Spanish provinces. E. Badian (Roman 
Imperialism in the Late Republic, pp. 18-26) has well shown 
that the Republican government did not exhibit a systematic 
economic policy in dealing with its provinces. However, 
Caesar was a man who seemed to have a better grasp of the 
economic implications of his actions, but did he exhibit a 
particular plan of action in this·realm? 
I would like to thank the Department of Ancient Languages 
for its help and encouragement in this endeavor, in particular, 
my advisor, Dr. J.s. White whose advice has been invaluable 
and Dr. S.F. Johanson, who many tim�s has patiently endured 
my arguments. I am also indebted to Dr. T.R. Selby for his 
support and conoern and to the Graduate School which has made 
this year possible with its generous fellowship. Lastly, I 
would like to thank my wife for typing this paper and supporting 
me in the darkest hour of this endeavor. 
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Chapter I 
CAESAR IN SPAIN: AN ECONOMIC- POLICY? 
Roman interest in Spain dates back to at least 
before the Second Punic War. In 226 B.C. the Ebro treaty 
recognized Spain as the domain of Carthage; the rights of 
Saguntum which was allied to Rome had been guaranteed 
earlier. Following the settlement of the war Spain became 
2 
Homan territory. For the next seventy years Spain was in 
fairly constant turmoil and revolt. While Homan rule has 
generally been characterized as "exploitation, not unmixed 
3 
with extortion," and territorial expansion at the expense 
of the natives, there were high spots under the administration 
of more sensible men such as Cato and Gracchus. From 154 
to 133 B.C. Spain was torn apart by two long wars for 
liberation; the Lusitanian War produced the hero of Spanish 
independence, Viriathus, and the Celtiberian War brought 
about a general acceptance of Roman authority. 
Although there were some incidences following the 
destruction of Numantia, the provinces of Spain were 
relatively peaceful, for this period saw political turmoil 
5 
in Rome and troubles in the East. Spain was not a center 
of interest again until the outbreak of the Sertorian War. 
Following the settlement of Pompeius, Spain remained 
relatively calm, until Caesar's expeditions in 61 and the 
outbreak of the Civil War in 49. Let us now take a look at 
the situation in Spain during the period following the 
Senatorial Commission of 133 B.C. 
2 
Since 197 B.C. Spain had been divided into two 
provinces, Ulterior and Citerior (Livy, 32.28.11). The 
chie� administrative official in each province was an 
6 
ex-praetor or ex-consul with imnerium proconsule. The staff 
of each governor consisted of one quaestor and three legati 
(one for an ex-praetor) and, of course, some lower echelon 
clerical workers. The term of duty was usually one year, 
though extensions were not unusual in times of trouble. 
The duties of the provincial administration, either 
under or with the approval of the Senate and limited by the 
7 
lex provinciae, are summarized by Van Nostrand: 
1. Collection of tribute, taxes, etc.
2. Regulation of industry, commerce and trade
3. Definition and protection of boundaries
4. Introduction and supervision of Roman Law
5. Determination of political status of communities
6. Recommendation of individuals or groups for
citizenship
The duties of the quaestors were generally financial since 
8 
they were responsible for the stipendium. 
Spain was not the coveted opportunity that the Eastern 
9 
provinces were. There was less chance for personal profit 
and the absence. of publicani provided less chance for rewards, 
financial or political. 
It is not in the scope of this paper to delve into the 
complexities of Roman foreign policy, so let it suffice to 
say that in return for the organization and administration 
3 
Rome expected compensation, which she received in three 
10 
forms: money, men and the fruits of mines and fields. The 
major part of this was the tributum, which was a stipendium 
certum, part of which was paid as vicensumas (grain tax) at 
11 
the rate of one twentieth or half a tithe. The stipendium 
was paid generally in coin but sometimes in kind directly 
to the quaestor by the natives so no tax contracts were 
involved. 
For the early period of Roman rule Livy provides an 
idea of the amounts of gold and silver which were extracted 
from Spain, though there is some dispute as to the exact 
12 
nature of the Oscenses argenti. These metals probably were 
not a part of the stipendium but rather fell to Rome as the 
produce of state owned mines. The yield decreased from its 
early magnitude and in the time of Polybius was about 25,000 
denarii annually (34.9) from the mines near Carthage Nova. 
The term vectigalia was used to designate a variety of 
13 
other taxes. Sources for these taxes are scanty, and much 
is assumed from the policies in other provinces. The portoria, 
customs duties, were two per cent and applied only to goods 
entering or leaving the province, thus intra-province trade 
14 
was duty-free. Various other taxes covering inheritance, 
manumission and· sales were imposed, and probably additional 
monies were collected from the leasing of whatever ager 
publicus the provinces contained, forests and a probable salt 
15 
monopoly. 
Plutarch (Pomp. 45) provides a definite account of 
4 
public finance for 6J B.C., before the inclusion of Pompeius 1
new provinces. The annual income of Rome was 50,000,000 
denarii a year, and Spain's proposed portion about six million, 
later five to eight million, not including portoria and 
"other less important sources like the monopolies on public 
16 
forests, and the fishing, river and salt taxes." Thus 
Spain, as a whole, stands as the second most important source 
of revenue to the Republic prior to the settlement of 
Pompeius' new provinces. 
The primary administrative expense of the provinces 
of Spain was the army, usually one or two full legions in 
each province, from the fall of Numantia to the Civil Wars 
17 
of Caesar. Caesar found two legions in Ulterior when he 
arrived as proconsul (Plut. Caes. 12). Surely during the 
Sertorian War the number had been greater. In 55 B.C. 
P9mpeius was given both provinces of Spain with four legions 
which he probably increased to six regular legions and one 
in Italy; the budget was one thousand talents (six million 
18 
denarii). T. Frank estimates a legion at about 800,000 
to 1,000,000 denarii a year, from which we can see that the 
major expense was the armies. If administrative costs and 
expenses for public works, roads, harbors, etc. are included, 
it is probable.that the budget generally broke even and at 
times, such as when additional troops were needed, was "in 
the red. 11 
In dealing with the flow of wealth in or out of Spain, 
its balance of payments, other aspects are scantly recorded. 
5 
Money taken out by each administration varied greatly 
depending on the greed and ethics of the governor. Caesar 
enriched himself handsomely when he was proconsul, probably 
taking out enough to cover his supposed twenty-five million 
dena�ii debt (App. B,C. 2.26), but this was an unusual case 
and affected parts of the peninsula which were not under 
Roman control until that time. The sums extracted by other 
governors were not nearly as large during peaceful times, 
and that Spain was not considered as lucrative an assignment 
as the Eastern provinces has already been pointed out. The 
removal of money from the provinces as profits of tax 
farmers was small because·the main bulk of the taxes, the 
stipendium, was not farmed out, and natives probably 
19 
received the contracts for portoria and other minor taxes. 
Commercial investments in the provinces were high. 
"It is likely that renewed placements of investments abroad 
20 
used more Italian credit than the profits brought." During 
Cicero's consulship an embargo on gold and silver leaving 
21 
Italy was imposed. Though this primarily was going to the 
Eastern provinces, it does show that there was some concern 
for Rome's balance of payments and it is not unreasonable 
to assume that some of these investments were headed for Spain. 
It seems to me -that the balance of payments during this 
period was generally in favor of Spain. Yet Spain provided 
a source of funds for individuals such as Caesar and 
Pompeius and was known as a land of wealth. Let us now 
examine that wealth and its relation to the economic 
6 
situation before Caesar's quaestorship. 
Spain was well known in ancient times as a source of 
mineral wealth. Pliny (N,H. 3.30) states "metallis plumbi, 
ferri, aeris, argenti, auri tota ferme Hispania. 11 Even 
Catuilus comments on its wealth in one of his poems (29.19), 
probably referring to the activities of Caesar as proconsul. 
Roman mining in Spain was extensive, but evidence dealing 
with Republican times is not as extensive as that for the 
22 
Imperial period. Archaeological evidence is also meager 
in that few sites have been extensively examined, and certain 
problems present in the mines have tended to obscure workings 
of the Republican period. Many mines were continuously or 
intermittently worked which destroyed some evidence of earlier 
workings. Rio Tinto mines were worked by Carthaginians; the 
23 
Romans then worked them for gold and silver (Strabo 3.2.8). 
Important finds of first century B.C. coins have been found 
in the mining town there, showing it was well worked in the 
late Republic. The mines reached their peak in the first and 
second centuries of our era, were reopened by Visigoths in 
the fourth and are even being worked today for copper. Ancient 
slag heaps were sometimes re-smelted for whatever ore was left 
when the mines were worked out, thus destroying evidence of 
earlier workings. Many less elaborately worked mines provide 
difficult dating due to the similarity in techniques and 
equipment of the period extending from early times to the 
Middle Ages. 
The Romans did work the mineral deposits in Spain 
7 
extensively during the Republican times. Ownership of the 
24 
mines is in dispute. Probably the Romans overtook 
ownership of silver and gold mines which the Carthaginians 
had worked. Livy's accounts of silver and gold reserves 
taken- to Rome were probably from state owned mines. Strabo 
25 
(J.2.1O) definitely stated that during his time the mines 
were privately owned and T. Frank supposes they were sold 
26 
during the Sullan_period. Crassus owned mines in Spain 
during Caesar's time (Plut. Crass. 2), and mining companies 
(societas) are noted in the Republican lead mines. Later, 
Tiberius is credited with having begun the state takeover of 
privately owned mines (Tac. Ann. 6.19.1). On the running of 
the state owned mines leased to individual miners and the 
organization of the administration of the mines and mining 
communities, the· Lex Metalli Vipascensis provides valuable 
27 
information dealing with Imperial times. Some similar, 
though not as extensive regulations, were probably in effect 
for state owned mines during Republican times to insure 
work was maintained and controlled. 
Roman mining differed economically from modern in 
28 
certain aspects. Quick profits were important due to a 
lack of extensive credit, thus ore with a somewhat lower 
percentage was not smelted, though in a long-term operation 
it would have been profitable. While the market for metals 
was less sensitive on a short term due to the slowness of 
communication, new finds would drastically change the gold­
silver-bronze ratio. Labor was basically manual though large 
8 
mines in Imperial times did show some surprising technical 
and engineering advances such as the Archimides screw 
(cochlea) and water wheels for drainage, hoists for hauling 
and even the diverting of rivers for hydraulic mining. Labor 
was e1ther low paid freemen or slave. Polybius (Strabo, 
3.2.10) recorded the workings around Carthago Nova which 
employed 40,000 workmen and yielded 25,000 drachmae, a 
profit of seven per cent. If the 25,000 indicated net profit, 
29 
however, the percentage would have been much higher. 
Gold was commonly found present with silver (Pliny, 
N,H. 33.80) and was mined in Spain during the Republican 
times, but the major gold fields of the Northwest were not 
opened to Romans until after Augustus' Spanish Wars. Silver 
remained the most sought precious metal in Spain during the 
Republic. Caesar himself in his triumph symbol_ized the 
province as the land of silver (Vell. Pater., 2.56.2). 
Hannibal took three hundred pounds of silver a day from 
Spanish mines, probably those around Carthage Nova (Pliny, 
N,H. 33.97); while the Roman yield after occupation was 
somewhat less, Livy still reports amounts which annually 
account for about five 
30 
from 218 to 168 B.C. 
31 
slowly played out, 
per cent of the estimated state income 
The mines around Carthage Nova were 
a fact which West assumes led to the 
32 
decline of that city as an administrative center. Augustus 
moved the capital of the Eastern province to Tarraco. Other 
silver mines in Citerior remained important though, with 
centers around Osca and modern Murcia. Around Castulo two 
9 
mining companies, metallum Samariense and Antonianum, were 
33 
considered important in Republican times. The Sierra 
Morena range proved to be very profitable and was extensively 
worked in Imperial times. Strabo mentions the importance 
of Turdetania and regions around Ilipa and Sisapo (3.2.3, 
3.2.8). Some areas in what later became Lusitania were 
probably opened as a result of Caesar's pacification of the 
34 
Western coast. 
Lead is commonly found in ores along with silver and 
was an important export of Spain in Republican times and 
continued to be so until high quality British lead dominated 
the market in the Early Empire (Pliny, N,H. 34.164). It is 
generally agreed that the lead mines were privately owned 
(Pliny, N,H. 34.165). At the modern Linares in the Sierra 
Morena range, where interruptions in operations which Davies 
relates to the activities of Sextus Pompeius in 44 B.C. are 
35 
noted, galena, lead ore, as well as silver were mined. Other 
centers were around Ilurco, Castona, Castulo and Ovetum, and 
lead coffins have been found at Hispalis (Seville). A 
number of lead ingots have been found, many attributable 
36 
to Spain with Republican inscriptions. 
Other metals and minerals played a role in Spain's 
mining economy;· tin or 11whi te lead II mines in Ovieda and 
Cantabria reopened during the first century B.C. Spanish 
tin monopolized the market during the early Imperial times 
as it was of a better quality than the English variety. 
Copper was an important metal in the Rio Tinto district as it 
10 
is today. Hispalis and Corduba served as centers for this 
trade. Numerous coins were found in this area from first 
century B.c.; while the metal itself was so cheap there that 
37 
it was used for objects made of terracotta in other places. 
Quicksilver was mined for making cinnabar (minium) and in 
purifying gold; antimony, used as a remedy, was possibly also 
38 
mined at Lineares. 
A good portion of the metals probably remained in 
the provinces, paid to the governors and then redistributed 
39 
as payment for troops and other administrative costs. 
Some of the metals were issued by the municipalities as 
local coinage, both in silver and bronze during the second 
40 
and first centuries B.C. The profits, though, did not aid 
41 
the natives as much as the Italians and Romans in Spain. 
The owners of the lead mines known from the ingots mentioned 
above were all Italians. Some metal would have been removed 
from the provinces as profits by Romans who did business 
there, such as mine owners like Crassus, or as personal 
gains by governors and their staffs. This loss was probably 
balanced by investments and immigration from Italy. 
Spain was also considered a land of great agricultural 
wealth in its early days (Polybius, 3.17.J; also, later, 
Justinus, 44.1), but such was not actually the case. In 
the early times of Roman rule, grain had to be sent to 
42 
Spain. Agriculture was limited during Republican times 
to the South and East coast regions for the central highlands 
were not well suited for farming. West notes that presently 
11 
thirty-three per cent of the land is in grain, forty per 
cent in forests and pastures, four and one half per cent in 
vines and olives and feels these are approximate for the 
43 
Empire. The percentages were probably not as large in 
Republican times, and olive growing especially had not 
become as popular as it did under the Empire (Pliny, N,H. 
14.1.50, 1.5. 8). 
Grain production was estimated by Pliny as about 
equal to Gaul (N,H. 37.803}, and Strabo points out that some 
towns had to buy grain (3.1.2). Baetica, the rich plain 
between Flumen Anas and Baetis, was important as an area 
of grain cultivation. The town of Eborce was also called 
44 
Cerialis and the coins of Acinipo, Ilipense and Ulia show 
wheat as a symbol. Caesar mentions the grain of Citerior 
(B,C. 1.48-49, 2.18), but this was probably only for local 
use, and for any invading armies which happened to be involved 
in a Civil War around there. Barley was grown around 
Carthage Nova. By the time of the Empire, "Spain as a 
whole was self-supporting, but ••• the Baetis Valley alone 
4.5 
had a surplus to be exported." 
Olive cultivation requires time and capital to 
establish. While groves are mentioned twice in the Bellum -
Hispaniense (27.1,3) they were probably not grown extensively 
outside of the urbanized Baetis Valley until after Augustus 
brought peace to the province. West points to the need of 
urbanization and the growth of the concept of capitalistic 
farming on a more profitable scale spurring on the change from 
12 
grain to olive farming. He shows that the restriction placed 
on viniculture and olive growing in the Republican times 
seemed to have little effect, especially in olive production. 
There is doubt, though, whether this restriction was imposed 
on al� the provinces or only on Gaul and whether it was 
intended to aid Italian farmers and wine merchants or those 
47 
of Massilia. In any case, the cultivation of olives, a 
very profitable and important industry in Spain under the 
Empire, began in Republican times. 
Wine was an important product of Spain during the 
late Republican and early Imperial times; Baetica exported 
48 
large quantities before Augustus, and Pliny later 
records Spanish wine as the best of the inferior wines 
{N,H. 14.41, 30.71). Viniculture was also more profitable 
than grain. 
Spain was noted during Caesar 1 s time for other 
agricultural products which included spartum for rope, 
honey of Celtiberia and figs. Animals also provided a 
profitable business. Polybius mentioned oxen, cattle, 
swine and sheep {34.8.7-10), and Caesar mentions the 
purchase of Spanish horses for his Gallic campaigns (B,G. 
49 
7.55). The period following the fall of Numantia was a 
generally peac�ful and stable time; agriculture showed 
50 
" greater diversification and a more intensive cultivation" 
than was possible before, especially in the South and on 
the Eastern coast. 
The fishing industry of Spain was well known for its 
46 
garum, the best coming from Carthago Nova (Pliny, N,H. 
51 
31.94). A more important and profitable industry was 
13 
salt fish, tunny and mackerel especially. Coins of Gades, 
Ilipa, Emporiae and certain other towns regularly used the 
tunny fish as a symbol. Spanish oysters, while known, 
West feels were not exported. 
Industry, trade and commerce were also growing 
52 
during the late Republic. Sea trade.was extensive. The 
port of Gades, especially active, was mentioned by Caesar 
(B,C. 2.18). Baetica, as already mentioned, was prosperous 
in agricultural produce and minerals, and the Punic traders 
had probably already laid the foundations for commerce 
there before the Romans arrived. On the East coast, 
Carthago Nova had a fine port, while Tarraco terminated a 
land trade route to Italy. The river system of Spain 
played an important part in the trade, both within Spain 
itself and between Spain and Italy, its chief export 
53 
destination. 
Trade appears to be in private hands until the time 
54 
of the Severii, and control may have been in the hands of 
55 
Italians or Romans. Spain was considered one tax unit so 
intra-provincial trade would produce a higher profit, while 
export-import business was subject to a two per cent (or 
two and one half per cent) tariff • 
. Municipal development was also advancing during the 
late Republic. The South, the area to become the province 
of Baetica under Augustus, was becoming quite urbanized and 
14 
adopted many Roman customs. Strabo says that they even 
forgot their own language (J.2.15), an obvious exaggeration. 
The hill-towns and tribal units of the central highlands 
were declining. We shall look more closely at the aspects 
of municipal development and 11Romanization 11 in the last 
chapter of this paper when we discuss Caesar's encouragement 
of municipal advancement. It will suffice to say that 
some progress had been made and that Spain was ready for 
the steps that Caesar was to take. 
Polybius gives us a summary of the prices in Southern 
57 
Spain for c. 150 B.C. (34.8.7-10). The prices and the 
cost of living which is inferred from them was considerably 
lower than that at Rome, while it is interesting to note, 
slightly higher than those in the Po Valley (Polybius, 2.15). 
This fact would give impetus to immigration of Italian poor 
who have already been mentioned in connection with mining 
and commerce. Rostovtzeff noted that the flow of emigration 
from Italy during the first century B.C. shifted from East 
58 
to West due to the troubles in the East. There were enough 
citizens in Ulterior during the Civil Wars for Varro's 
call up of 18,000,000 HS, 20,000 pounds of silver, and 
120,000 modii of grain (Caes., B,C. 2.18). 
After the fall of Numantia in 133 B.C. there was 
a period of general economic growth in the settled regions 
of the Spanish provinces, interrupted first by the Sertorian 
War. Caesar's military expedition of 61 B.C. did not 
affect the civilized parts of the provinces greatly, but the 
15 
Civil Wars of Caesar and later Augustus brought on hardship. 
The growth after 133 was slow and uneven; Rome's policy did 
not seem to attempt to foster either economic or urban 
growth directly, and the Spains suffered at the hands of 
poor governors and a slowness of change.· An example is the 
bankruptcy revision enacted by Caesar while proconsul 
(Plutarch, Caes. 12). In a period of economic growth, loans 
would foster expansion, but Spain's laws and the collection 
of a debt were very strict. Add to this debts incurred 
from the reparation of the Sertorian War along with the 
general conservative reluctance of the governors and a debt 
problem arises of the magnitude to make it worthy of mention 
in Plutarch's biography., Such unwillingness to deal promptly 
with the problems of the province in addition to an 
unsensitive administration hindered development which might 
have blossomed in the first century B.C. instead of the first 
century A.D. But such was not the case. When Caesar enters 
the picture, Spain was growing at an erratic rate economically. 
16 
Footnotes·for Chapter I 
1. For history of early Spain see Livy, Appian and
Polybius; recent works: A. Schulten, Cambridge Ancient 
History, 1930, VIII, 306-324, and Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, Real­
Encyclopaedie, 1913, XVI, 2, col. 2028-46; C.H.V. 
Sutherland, The Romans in Suain, 217 B,C.- A,D. 117 tLondon: 
Methuen and Co., 1939). 
2. For the Roman attitude on the ownership of provincial
land during the Republic, T. Frank, "'Dominium in solo 
provinciali' and 'Ager publicus, 1" JRs; XVII (1927), 141-161, 
and A.H.M. Jones, "In eo solo dominium populi Romani est vel 
Caesaris," JRS, XXXI (1941), 26-31. 
J. Sutherland, QR. cit., p. 71.
4. Appian, Iber. 45-97; for expenses of these wars, T.
Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1933), I, 222-223. 
5. Sporadic trouble and wars of expansion did occur;
in c. 98 the Arevaci revolted and in 92 the Celtiberians again. 
These wars did not greatly affect the settled areas of the 
provinces not stir enthusiasm in Rome. For other minor wars 
see Fasti Triumnhales. App., Iber. 99-100. 
6. For early administration J.J. Van Nostrand, The
Reorganization of Spain J2x. Augustus (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1916), pp. 90-95, and G.H. Stevenson, Cambridge 
Ancient History, 1932, IX, 437-474. In 65 Gn. Calpurnius 
Pisa was sent to Spain as guaestor propraetore. He seems to 
be the only quaestor sent as governor. 
?. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 92-93. 
8. Quaestors could serve as judicial officers, as
Caesar himself did (Suet., Iul. 8). 
9. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 86-87.
10. J.J.·van Nostrand, An Economic Survey of Ancient
Rome, Roman Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1937), III, 
127-28.
11. Livy, 29.3.5, 4J.2.12, 30.26.6. This seems to have
been the rate set by the Carthaginians. Sources on all the 
taxes of Spain for the Republican period are at times scanty, 
some of them must be inferred from the policies in other 
provinces, Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 126-135. 
17 
12. For a complete list of references, Van Nostrand,
Economic Survey, III, 128-129, also T. Frank, Economic 
Survey, I, 154-156; on the question of Oscenses argenti, 
G.F. Hill, Notes .Qn the Ancient Coinage of Hispania Citerior 
(New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1931), pp. 135-139. 
13. New portoria and vectigalia were established in
179 B.C. (Livy 40.51.8); generally, on such taxes, Van 
�ostrand, Economic Survey, III, 145-147. 
14. Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 146; 2½% is
supposed from the inscribed potsherds of Monte Testaccio; T. 
Frank "On export tax of Spanish harbors," AJP, LVII 
(1936�, 87-90, and "Notes on Roman commerce, 11 JRS, XXVII 
(1937), 72-79; most potsherds are from the Empire though. 
15. Ager publicus would include leases of mines. T.
Frank, " 1 Dominium in solo provinciali 1 and 'Ager publicus, 1"
JRS, XVII (1927), 145, feels the only ager publicus in 
Spain during the Republic was near Carthage Nova and in the 
mining regions. 
16·. T. Frank, Economic Survey, I, 228-229 323-324; 
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Chapter II 
In the ten years between 69 and 59 B.C., C. Julius 
Caesar, while holding all the offices to which a Roman 
nobilis was entitled (except censor and dictator), had his 
first extensive contact with provincial finances on.an 
administrative level. This contact centered in Hispania 
Ulterior, the province of Further Spain. Here he served as 
quaestor, here he first won the title of imperator, here he 
was able to set his personal finances in order, and here 
he formulated some of the policies of finance which he later 
employed as dictator. In this chapter we shall look at 
some aspects of Caesar's early career, in particular his 
financial policies in Spain, and attempt a comparison with 
his later policies in the field of credit and debt. 
Caesar held the office of quaestor in 69, and as 
such was appointed to the staff of the governor of Hispania 
Ulterior, the ex-praetor Antistius Vetus, whose son later 
served Caesar during the Civil Wars. According to Suetonius 
(IJJ.l. 7.1) Caesar's assignment was judicial; "cum mandatu 
PR. iure dicun�o," he conducted court on an assize circuit 
throughout the conventus. The language itself of the passage 
indicates a reliable authority in as much as Suetonius 
had access to official records. Though little other evidence 
exists concerning Caesar's quaestorship, with the exception 
22 
of certain biographical anecdotes which are disputed, it 
is probable that he was at least introduced to the 
administrative organization of provincial finances and of 
the economics of Spain in particular. 
Although Caesar took an active interest in his duties 
and he himself supposedly said 11 • • •  initio quaesturae suae earn 
provinciarn ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse 
et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse 11 (Bell. 
Hisp. 42), his interests lay elsewhere than in the provinces. 
At thirty years of age his election to the quaestorship 
.provided him a seat in the Senate under the Sullan 
constitution, and it is reasonable to ,assume that his interest 
would have been the furthering of his own career. He left 
his post early and on the return journey the puzzling 
anecdote concerning his unsuccessful attempt to further 
incite the Transpadanes who were already "de petenda civitate 
4 
agitantes" (Suet. Iul. 8). 
Caesar I s next service in Spain came in 61, when the ( 
province of Ulterior fell to him after his praetorship. He 
served there "pro consule" according to Suetonius. On-his 
way out of town, Caesar was accosted by his creditors 
(Suet., Iul. 18; Plut., Caes. 11). It would be helpful at 
this point to look at Caesar's personal financial situation 
in order to gain some insight into the political and 
economic motivation which might have instigated the actions 
during his proconsulship in Spain, both military and 
economic. 
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A political career had become quite costly by the 
time of the late Republic and "the Roman Senator, particularly 
in the early part of his career, was fre
6
uently in debt well 
above his weal th and disposable assets. '' Aedileships 
became especially expensive, which led Cicero to comment 
· on its necessity but to advise remaining within one's
resources (Off. 2.57). The cost of elections was skyrocketing
as was the use of bribery and secret agreements which can be
seen in the frequent accusations of ambitus. The involved
situation of the consular election of 54 B.C. is a good
example, while for the cost of the votes, Caesar's own
words to his mother concerning his pontifical election, " ••• dum
se nisi pontificem non reversurum" (Suet., Iul. 13), provide
some idea. Indeed, his opponent Catulus tried to remove
Caesar from the running by offering to pay some of his debts
(Plut., Caes. 7.2). The money lenders themselves were not
unwilling to make a profit from elections as can be seen
in the sudden rise bf the interest rate from four to eight
per cent in 54 (Cic.,Att. 4.15.7; Quint. 2.14.4).
In as much as eligibility for office required at 
least Equestrian status along with a wealth in disposable 
resources of 400,000 HS, and by law (though probably not 
generally enforced until after 49 B.C.) the hoarding of 
coin was restricted, much of a man's wealth would necessarily 
be tied up in land with which he would be unwilling to part 
as it was an indication of his financial position. The sale 
of a large portion of a Senator's property could reflect on 
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his credit standing, his fides. This hold on land prompted 
Caesar to remark: 11 • • •  integras vero tenere possessiones, 
qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae 
est? 11 (B,C. 3.20). As a result a politician would often 
borrow when in need of cash rather than liquidate his 
own resources. 
"To remain a senator not only in legal terminology 
8 
your existimatio, but also your fides must remain intact." 
Failure to meet financial obligations was a cruel fortune 
under Roman law. The treatment of debtors was harsh. 
Proscriptio and venditio bonorum could result, and a man 
might even be banned from public places (infarnia) or removed 
from the Senate by the censors. This would quite literally 
ruin a politician's career for life. However, the process 
of temporary bondage (addictio) to the creditor was 
probably not enforced in the late Republic. 
Unless one had a considerable family fortune at his 
disposal the obvious and only solution was to borrow. But 
this road ran in two directions. The loan was in actuality 
an investment in the future of the rising politician often 
with no tangible security or collateral. A good deal of 
the money was spent on intangibles such as games or ambitus. 
For a creditor whose only interest was the recovery of 
his capital, the calling up of such a debt would not readily 
be an advantage. The money had been spent. Caesar 
recognized the duality of the creditor-debtor relationship 
when he borrowed from his officers to pay his soldiers 
2.5 
(Caes., B,C. 1.39). Frederiksen believes this was the reason 
9 
for Caesar's loan from Cicero in 47 or 46. 
The complexities of personal finances can be seen 
in Cicero's loan mentioned above. After repeated attempts 
to_collect, Caesar's secretary Faberius offered to pay off 
the debt with the notes of others, a process called delegatio 
debitoris (Cic., Att. 12.3.2). 
"The greater the wealth that could be concentrated in 
the hands of individuals, the more the struggle for political 
10 
power was transformed into a problem of finance." It was 
of great importance for the rising politician to be an 
expert at manipulating funds, usually someone else's, and 
Caesar was an expert. Though his family was not one of 
the wealthiest, Caesar managed to raise the funds for an 
extravagant early career. Plutarch reports that he was 
already thirteen hundred talents in debt before he held any 
public office (Caes • .5.4) and surely his quaestorship 
would not have provided all the sums he would need. As 
curator of the Appian Way in 67 B.c., he spent personal funds 
for some of the work. As aedile, he furnished public 
works and exhibitions and a gladitorial show in honor of 
his father which threatened to be so extravagant that the 
Senate limite4 the number of pairs of combatants. His 
election as pontifex maximus and praetor must have been 
very costly, but it was not political costs alone that 
increased Caesar's debts. He was well known for his 
extravagance, such as the villa on Lake Nemi, which when 
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found distasteful he had torn down and rebuilt, or Servillia 1 s 
pearl. It is not surprising that his debts amounted to 
11 
twenty-five million denarii as Appian states (B,C. 2.26). 
Caesar was a good manipulator, even if one believes 
only a part of his financial involvements while he was 
consul and later Gallic proconsul, absent from Rome. He· 
made a good profit from the Egyptian affair, dividing 
six thousand talents from Ptolemy Auletes (the Flute-player) 
with Pompeius, a scheme that Crassus had attempted a few 
years earlier but failed (Suet. Iul. 54). His intrigues 
in the scandalous election of 54 B.C. and his 11 buying 11 of 
many Senators with Gallic money were well known, and mention 
has already been made of his use of the creditor-debtor 
relationship. From his management of his personal funds 
we can see that Caesar had a good grasp of the intricacies 
of financial manipulation along with the problems of debt 
and that at the time of his leaving for Spain he was very 
much in debt and on bad terms with his creditors (Suet.,Iul. 
18; Plut.,Caes. 11). 
Who these creditors were we are not told, but 
whoever they were, their action at this precise time seems 
strange. We may well understand their seeing the period 
between Caesar!s immunity as praetor and his actual accession 
to the proconsulship as their only chance for legal steps 
to recover their money, but their action came just before 
Caesar had an opportunity to improve his personal fortune 
(or rather the lack thereof) for the first time. It is very 
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unlikely that, had Caesar been unable to persuade Crassus or 
some other wealthy individual to cover his debts until he 
returned from Spain, these creditors would have been able 
to recover their investments.· The money had already been 
spent mostly on intangibles - games, elections and public 
works. 
Two explanations may be proposed for this inopportune 
recall of loans. It might well have been politically 
instigated by Caesar's enemies to delay his departure from 
Rome. That Caesar was in a hurry to depart for Spain is 
related by Suetonius (Iul. 18) and Michael Grant rightly 
suggests that he felt uncomfortable with the victorious 
Pompeius returning in part due to his supposed intrigue 
12 
with Pompeius' wife, Mucia. Caesar's enemies realized that 
a delay in his departure would afford them a delightful 
opportunity to create animosity between Pompeius and Caesar. 
While this supposition on political grounds may be 
likely we are given no support for it from our sources. It 
is more likely that this was merely a manifestation of the 
need for money among the money lenders. With the advent 
of Pompeius, new opportunities for investment in the new 
Asian provinces would open. During Cicero's consulship 
it was necessary to restrict the outflow of gold and silver 
13 14 
from Italy. Allen has proposed that this money was to 
be used in provincial investments. If Caesar's creditors were 
money lenders of the Ordo Eguestris, which seems likely, 
they would have been in need of ready cash for investment in 
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Asia. They might well have assumed that wealthy Crassus, to 
whom Caesar had been allied in the past and who wished to 
oppose the returning Pompeius, would be willing to cover some 
of his debts now, which he did with eight hundred and thirty 
talents (Plut., Caes. 11). They would be willing to forgo 
the additional year's interest in favor of the possibly 
larger gains to be made, so Caesar merely exchanged one 
group of creditors for another, Crassus, who might be 
expected to support his ally more willingly. 
Caesar's haste to leave for his province has already 
been mentioned, and indeed, he did leave before the 
allotment of and budget for the province had been formally 
ratified by the Senate (Suet.,Iul. 18). Suetonius gives two 
reasons - to avoid lawsuits, possibly more actions by 
creditors, or " ••• quo maturius sociis inplorantibus 
subveniret"; calling to mind his later haste to reach Genava 
in 58 B.c. (Caes., B,G. 1.7). As soon as Caesar arrived 
in Spain he raised an additional ten cohorts to augment the 
forces already there (Plut., Caes. 12) and Caesar might well 
have used the "socii inplorantes" and his necessity for 
early departure to request additional funds in the budget to 
support this new legion. However, these cohorts could surely 
have been paid.from the booty, and Caesar would have had 
some idea of the extent of the profits to be gained and expenses 
and necessities before beginning his campaign. We are not 
given any information that the allotment for Spain was 
increased at this time. 
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Caesar's term as proconsul in Ulterior was characterized 
by two aspects. The first was his military exploitation 
for personal financial rewards and augmentation of his 
political career by conquest. The other was his administrative 
reforms of the Spanish economic situation. According to T. 
Frank, "Julius Caesar provided the ugl�est example in 
15 
Roman history of provincial looting for personal gain." 
might partially excuse Caesar's ruthless conquests on the 
We
basis of bringing peace to a region which was being ravaged 
by the most savage and incorrigible brigands, but such does 
not seem to be the case. Dio (J7.52.l-2) explicitly states 
that the situation was not as grave as Caesar's actions were 
brutal and excessive. Suetonius (Iul. 54) tells us that he 
plundered a certain Lusitanian town after it had surrendered. 
While the brigandage along the northern borders of Hispania 
Ulterior had been a constant and expensive burden, there is 
no evidence, neither primary nor secondary other than 
Suetonius' brief statement (Iul. 18), that would indicate 
it was any worse at this particular time, nor that it 
threatened the province to such an extent that Caesar had to 
rush to his command and raise an additional ten cohorts, 
bringing the strength of the contingent to about three legions. 
As expl�nation, not excuse, we may look to the system 
itself, which produced governors who acted as Caesar did. 
The career of a Roman politician was expensive and often 
as not he was considerably indebted by the time of a 
provincial appointment. Since government service paid no 
JO 
salary, a magistrate looked to his provincial term to provide 
some capital to help cover the expenses incurred in gaining 
the office. In this light, the Senate would sometimes vote 
a surplus in the last provincial appointment for a magistrate, 
as_was probably the case in the unusually high four and 
one half million denarii Macedonian budget for L. Piso in 
16 
58. Caesar was personally indebted and the province
provided a long-awaited means of alleviating some of that 
burden while also increasing his political reputation by 
the title of imperator. Our sources are in agreement that 
his military operations made him wealthy and provided some 
booty to the treasury (App., B,C. 2.8). 
When Caesar had concluded his conquests, having 
enriched himself that he might return to Home " ••• cuius nunc 
venti valde sunt secundi" (Cic., Att. 2.1.6) and been 
proclaimed imperator, he turned to affairs of administration 
as proconsul and patron of the province. We see here a policy 
similar to the one he followed later in Gaul, fighting during 
the season and civil administration during the off season. 
Appian (B,C. 2.8) specifically states that Caesar 
neglected public and judicial administration. This 
statement follows in context his account of Caesar's conquests 
and precedes Caesar's return to Home to stand for consul, 
so it cannot be taken in the supposition that Caesar at 
first neglected administrative duties in favor of conquest 
and must stand as an overall statement concerning Appian's 
view of the proconsulship. Contemporary sources tell us 
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that Caesar was active as a benefactor in civil and judicial 
administration. Cicero mentions this in his speech Pro 
Balbo 43; Caesar himself in the De Bello Civili 2.18,20; 
and mention is also made in the De Bello Hispaniensi 42. 
Plutarch (Caes. 12) is a specific source for a debt settlement 
in Spain. It appears that Appian either overlooked Caesar's 
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civil measures through lack of proper preparation and 
proper source material, or that he is attempting to shade 
Caesar's character as a civil administrator in favor of his 
military prowess. For such a purpose, a simple omission 
would not have been sufficient. 
Our sources mention two main actions by Caesar 
concerning the economic status of the province: 
l.' Caesar sought to lessen the burden of taxation 
imposed since the Sertorian War: "insequente praetura 
ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus inposuisset 
a senatu petisse et ea pecunia provinciam liberasse ••• " 
(Bell. Hisp. 42). 
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During the campaign against Sertorius, Q. Caeclius 
Metellus Pius served as governor of Ulterior. Following 
the murder of Sertorius in 72 and the final operations of 
the war in 71 a settlement was made by Pompeius. In Citerior 
PQmpeius seems to have acted justly and gained many clientes. 
As a result, Citerior is an especially active Pompeian 
stronghold during the Civil Wars for Pompeius and later for 
his sons, a fact of which Caesar took note later (B,C. 2.18). 
Grants of citizenship, affirmed by Lex Gellia Cornelia, 
18 
even extended into Ulterior. Metellus must have imposed 
certain taxes to cover some of the cost of the war, either 
during or in the final settlement, and these taxes were still 
in effect when Caesar arrived as the statement in the De 
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Bello Hispaniensi indicates. 
The term vectigalia generally is used to include taxes 
other than tributum, which for Spain had been a half a tithe 
since Carthaginian times (Livy 43.2.12) and had been increased 
in the past to pay war costs, as in 203 B.C. "Stipendium eius 
anni duplex et frumentum sex mensum imperatum ••• " (Livy 29.J.5).
Vectigalia included the various other taxes, such as 
revenues from the mines and public land, customs duties 
(two or two and one-half per cent), inheritance taxes (five 
per cent), manumission of slaves (five per cent), sale of 
slaves (four per cent). The reason that Metellus increased 
vectigalia as opposed to tributum is not given, nor which 
particular vectigalia were increased. That the author (Bell. 
Hisp. 42) was unaware of the distinction between the two 
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terms, and thus used vectigalia in a general sense is unlikely, 
especially as the words are said to have come directly from 
Caesar's mouth. 
Ulterior was a prosperous and well urbanized section 
o�_Spain, particularly around the old Punic centers in the
South. The cities of the South such as Gades, Hispalis and 
Corduba had grown prosperous. Mines of the Rio Tinto and 
Sierra Morena were prospering. In agriculture olives were 
beginning to be profitable, large quantities of wine were 
being exported (Strabo 3.2.6} and much grain was being raised. 
Shipping and commerce were profitable, especially around 
Gades. An increase in vectigalia would be effective in 
this prosperous section for deriving money from cities, 
mines and produce which would not be covered by tributum. 
By way of precedent, Lucullus, attempting to ease the burden 
of debt which Sulla left Asia had shifted from land taxes to 
21 
those which could be collected in cities of little land. 
This supposes an ingenuity which Metellus did not seem to 
have possessed, but there is little other information with 
which to work. 
It has been generally assumed that the debts referred 
to by Plutarch (Caes. 12} were also a result of the 
22 
settlement of the Sertorian War, and it is likely that 
some of the debts were outstanding from the imposition of 
new or the increase of already existing vectigalia by 
Metellus and mentioned above. Sutherland accounts for the 
debts, and rightly I believe, on the basis of economic 
34 
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advancement and increase in exports. The previous fifty 
years of the Republic had seen economic advances, especially 
in southern Spain, and such advances were likely to bring 
on loans for expansion. 
The debt measure instituted by Caesar was not a 
cancellation, as Plutarch clearly states, but rather provided 
for the settlement of the debts, still to be paid in full, 
and eased the burden of the debtor. As to the interest on 
the debt, usually about twelve per cent, nothing is said. 
The creditors were most probably natives, either Spaniards 
or Italian businessmen in Spain, for loans from Rome had 
been restricted both by the Lex Gabinia de Usura, which 
in effect prohibited loans to provincials from Rome, and 
by the later restrictions, passed during Cicero's consulship, 
25 
which forbade the export of gold or silver. In the same 
light, the word 8t<T1tOT"IJl' indicates that the debtors were
26 
probably individual land owners rather than cities. The 
effect Caesar's action had was to establish a less severe 
method of repayment of debts by natives while keeping the 
debtor a productive member of his community. 
This debt settlement has been compared to that which 
27 
Lucullus attempted in Asia. In this settlement, though, 
the cities themselves were indebted and the creditors 
28 
were, in some cases, publicani. Caesar's settlement 
granted a more favorable percentage (two-thirds) to the 
creditors than did Lucullus 1 one-fourth. The gratitude 
of the Ordo Eguestris surely should not be overlooked as a 
I 
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political motive. 
Both of the measures which Caesar undertook in Spain 
should have had the effect of easing circulation and credit 
within the province. The money from the vectigalia remaining 
in-the province would offset booty taken by Caesar (mostly 
from the less civilized North) and spur local investment, 
while a more reasonable solution to the debt question 
would make credit easier. While the creditor did receive 
less per year, the solvency of the debtor would ensure 
eventual payment in full without the necessity of foreclosure 
and auction of property. The continued ownership of the 
land by the debtor hindered the growth of latifundia, and 
created a better state of well being for the peasant 
29 
population. 
In Caesar's economic measures in Spain during his 
praetorship some writers have found a precedent for his 
later measures in handling the financial crisis created by 
JO 
the Civil War. The general's armed invasion of Italy 
brought on an immediate financial crisis, but the war itself 
was not as much an economic struggle as a political power 
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struggle. The initial impact, as in any time of crisis, was 
a general feeling of financial insecurity, heightened in 
the minds of the propertied class by the fears of complete 
remission of debts, novae tabulae, and agrarian reform 
through land confiscation. Coin would be the safest form 
for one's wealth at such a time; as a result debts would be 
called up. To add to the strain on the currency in 
36 
circulation, the armies had to be pai� to insure their 
loyalty. Caesar himself borrows from his officers to pay 
his troops (B.C. 1.39) and mints large quantities of new 
coin, reinstituting the sestertius and guinarius and creating 
32 
a -new issue of aurei. The need for money was great 
enough to risk the sanctity of the tribune by taking money 
from the Temple of Saturn, money reserved for protection 
33 
against a Gallic invasion. Pompeians also were in need of 
coin for troops. Varro calls up 18,000,000 HS and 2�4
000
pounds of silver from citizens in Hispania Ulterior. The 
voracity of the creditors and generals for coin created a 
shortage where one had not existed before th� crisis. Cicero 
called it caritas nummorum (Att. 9.94). In turn, money 
35 
became harder to borrow and property values dropped. 
Caesar shows some degree of insight in control of 
currency and credit in his attempt to handle this situation. 
The times were turbulent and his own position was not 
stable, even after Munda; he spent only a little more than 
a year in Rome between his invasion and his assassination. 
In such an atmosphere financial stability was naturally 
lacking. Whether his measures would have cured the ills, 
or what other measures he would have introduced, we shall 
never know. 
Caesar's measures were·aimed at freeing the flow of 
wealth and re-establishing credit by stabilizing property 
values and providing for the proper repayment of debts. Our 
sources differ in some aspects of the actual details, and the 
37 
dating of various measures is in dispute, but let us follow 
36 
some of the main points. 
The first step had already been taken when Caesar 
arrived - the lowering of the legal interest rate by the . 
37 
tribunes (Dio, 41.J?). Caesar provided for the transfer 
., I 
'�,, t X ·✓ � · ) as payment of debts and ,established 
•A- .,_ ..,.,a.,:;ors · to fix the value (aestimatio) of 
property at either the time of the loan (Dio, 42.51) or
1
1 ante civile bellum 11 (Suet. Iul. 42). Trebonius, as 
38 
praetor urbanus, was in charge of these aestimationes 
when the renewed call for novae tabulae arose from .Caelius, 
a former Catilinarian. The interest on these loans was 
dealt with probably in 47; either being deducted from the 
capital or cancelled since the war began (Dio, 42.51). 
Either case resulted in a net loss of about twenty-five 
per cent to creditors, but this was a loss only of interest, 
40 
not capital. 
Other measures were to spur the circulation of 
currency by limiting hoarding. For this Caesar reinstituted 
an old law which forbade the hoarding of more than 15,000 
41 
denarii. How effective this measure was we are not told. 
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Later, in 47 according to Dio (42.51), he released everyone 
from rent, up to 500 denarii, for one year - a measure 
which would aid the lower classes, the insula dweller in 
. 43, 
Rome and the tenant farmer in Italy. Caesar also 
reinstituted the uortoria on foreign goods (Suet, Iul. 43) 
and reduced the number on the corn dole. The new coin issues, 
J8 
already mentioned, though probably issued for military 
pay and equipment, would have found their way into circulation. 
44 
Frederiksen presents a good case from Tacitus 
(Ann. 6.16-17) for including in these measures a lex Iulia 
de_bonis cedendis, which provided a more lenient settlement 
of bankruptcy. Under such a measure the debtor would admit 
insolvency before the praetor and retain some portion of 
his estate while the remainder would be given over to the 
creditor{s) through a cessio bonorum. 
Such were Caesar's measures during his dictatorship. 
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That they probably had not affected a miraculous cure can 
be seen in Cicero (Marc. 23, Fam. 11.28.2). The confiscation 
of Pompeians' property as the Civil War dragged on kept 
46 
property values low. The political situation during the 
last six years of Caesar's life was never stable enough to 
be conducive to a stable economy. 
Both the measures in Spain during Caesar's proconsulship 
and those enacted during his dictatorship in Rome dealt to 
a large extent with the problems of debt and the debtor­
creditor relationship. In both situations Caesar followed 
47 
the middle road between complete remission of debt and 
complete enforcement of already existing laws. The 
similarity in easing the burden on the debtor is especially 
strong if we accept Frederiksen's lex Iulia. 
The situations which produced the problems, on the 
other hand, were quite different in scope and instigation. 
The measures in Spain were to counter problems which had 
39 
existed for a number of years and to free money for economic 
growth in a single province. Rome, on the other hand, 
was the financial center of the Mediterranean world by 
this time. Such measures, brought on by the political 
situation and its related currency and credit crisis, would 
have an effect elsewhere in the Roman World. 
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Chapter III 
The Spanish provinces were not directly affected 
by Caesar personally during the period from 61 until the 
•Civil Wars. They did play a part during the fifties as a
basis on which opposition to Caesar might build a balance
of power. During his consulship Caesar did affect extensive
legal revision of provincial administration which in part
required governors to settle their financial accounts in
the province before leaving. The lex Iulia repetundarum did
not seem to affect any miraculous change in attitude toward
the provinces though it made the administration more expedient
and provided grounds for actions against governors by
provincials.
In 55 B.C. Pompeius was given the governorship of 
both the Spanish provinces (Cic., Att. 4.9.1), but he 
remained in Home, presumably under the legal pretext of 
the curatio annonae which he had held since 57. In 52 he 
had his command extended for an additional five years 
(Plut., Pomp. 55.12, Caes. 28.8; Dio 40.44.2). The number 
of legions approximately doubled and a budget of six million 
denarii was provided. The opposition to Caesar surely saw 
this as a balance to Caesar's armies, especially after the 
death of Crassus and Pompeius seemed to be drawing more 
toward the senatorial point of view (Caes., B,C. 1.84). 
44 
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While Pompeius remained in Rome, Spain was administered 
by legati; by 49 the two provinces had been divided into three 
administrative units: Citerior, Ulterior (to the Anas) and 
the remaining part of Ulterior including Lusitania (Caes., 
B.�. 1.38), with a total of seven legions in all Spain.
This tripartite division of the Spanish peninsula by Pompeius 
can easily be seen as a precedent for Augustus' later 
division of Spain into three provinces. The southern part 
of Ulterior, particularly the Baetis Valley region, had grown 
very prosperous, while the central and western sections, 
where mineral and agricultural potential had not yet been 
fully utilized, had remained less urbanized since Caesar's 
proconsulship. In addition, the northern border was not 
completely peaceful until Augustus' conquests as can be seen 
5 
in the military nature of the colonies Caesar founded there. 
When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, Spain was in Pompeian 
hands under the legati, L. Afranius, M. Petreius, and the 
prolific author, M. Terrentius Varro. Spain was mustered to 
war (Caes., B,C. 1.38-39, 2.18). Pompeius had been a 
benefactor to the Spanish people from the time of the 
Sertorian War and his clientelae were numerous there (Caes., 
B,C. 1.61, 2.18). Caesar also had some political friendships 
in the peninsula, particularly in Ulterior. Some towns 
remained loyal to him, but the armies and the wealth of 
the province were under control of his opposition. 
"Economic motives are usually traced with ease in 
7 
the case of civil wars, but not in this one." The struggle 
46 
was a political and military one, centered around personal 
ambition and carried on through professional armies. 
Constitutional questions and political theory became material 
of propaganda; sides were taken on the basis of vested 
interest and personal alliances. Italy itself was not 
enthusiastic and neither side was able to call up large 
enlistments of troops for their cause. Much of the action 
was in the provinces, and there the burden of the armies was 
felt most heavily. 
Caesar quickly took Italy, Pompeius having fled from 
Brundisium. Caesar could not follow - no ships (Caes., B,C. 
1.29); he decided to turn his attention to Spain, The 
reason for this tactical movement was manysided. The lack 
of ships, the danger of leaving Italy with an unfriendly army 
in Spain, the Pompeian control of.grain supply, all seem to 
have played some part in his decision. The mines in Spain 
might also have been a concern. Caesar was in need of money 
for his troops (Caes., B,C. 1.39) and Italy itself was in 
financial crisis due to the shortage of coin. Control of 
Spain's metal wealth would not be essential in a short term 
war, but if the war were protracted, the necessity of coin 
to insure the loyalty of troops and stabilize the nhome-
10 
front" might W$11 be as important as the grain supply. 
Though no mention of the importance of Spain as a source of 
financial wealth is made, we do find that Caesar does not 
abstain from taking money after his initial victory there 
(Dio 42.24) and later in 46 B.C. he symbolized Spain as 
8 
47 
the land of silver (Vell. Pater. 2.56.2). This was surely 
not the most important reason for Caesar's Spanish campaigns, 
but it might well have played a part in his decision. 
Spain suffered during the Civil Wars with almost 
co�tant troubles. The initial actions did not bring wide­
spread hardship but the support of the huge armies and their 
later settlement in the province was not beneficial. Caesar's 
designee for governor was very poorly chosen. Q. Cassius 
Longinus began a systematic plundering of the provinces in 
11 
general with himself as benefactor which led to unrest and 
rebellion. Pompeian forces again gained some control over 
Spain which was not relaxed even after Munda, for Sextus 
Pompeius carried on his war after Caesar's death. 
Such an unstable political situation was not conducive 
to a stable economy for the province either as a self-
entity of as a part of the Roman world. Military operations 
affected the agricultural production. Grain was needed to 
feed the armies, taken from lands that probably did not 
produce a great surplus (Caes., B,C. 1.48,49), while the 
unstable political situation would discourage long-term 
investments such as olive growing. Mining and industry 
were affected, as we have already noted in the case of the 
mines at Linar�s. Commerce was also hampered, on land 
by the armies and at sea since ships were commandeered 
for movement of troops (Caes., B,C. 2.18,19). Some 
individuals surely prospered by supplying the armies, but 
the general unstable political situation and the uncertain 
future would make long-term planning difficult. Poor 
administration made the situation even less favorable. 
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Though this situation was less than beneficial, it 
was unavoidable in the power struggle which existed at 
that time. The political and personal conflict affected 
the provinces as well as the city itself, but·caesar had 
some concept of the need for stability and organization in 
Spain for the time when his civil conflicts were ended. This 
fact is evident in his steps toward municipal reorganization. 
"It was in the extension of the colonial system that his 
12 
finest achievement lay." 
Certain sections of Spain had been urbanized 
during the first century B.C. Economic opportunities, 
money and manpower immigrating from Italy spurred the 
growth of municipal centers. The growth of the mining 
industry and the diversification in agriculture have been 
noted in the first chapter of this paper. This growth was 
especially evident in the South (Strabo 3.2.15) and the 
east coast where centralization in towns which had a Punic 
13 
or Greek heritage arose from the need of commerce and wealth. 
In the central highlands and the western coast changes were 
also occurring. "The old tribal units were breaking down, 
and many village communities exercised the sovereign 
14 
rights of a Greek polis." The old native gentes, surrounding 
a fortified castellum, were developing into towns, some into 
the status of oppida stipendiaria. Only eight towns reached 
the status of municipium before Caesar's time in Citerior. 
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In both provinces the adaptation of Roman municipal 
systems was lacking. Formal Roman colonization was meager 
in Spain before Caesar. The first was Tarraco, noted by 
Pliny as Scipionum opus (N.H. 3.21) and later Graccuris 
and Valentia. 
Following Caesar's victory at Ilerda and his over­
throw of the Pompeian commanders in both provinces, he looked 
to the disbanding of the Pompeian armies and the insuring 
of a friendly province at his back when he proceeded east 
1.5 
again. Then, following the operations of 46 B.c., he again 
made grants of favor to his allies (Dio 43.39 • .5). Some 
towns were granted colonial status directly, such as Ucubi 
in Ulterior (Bell. Hisp. 27) while others such as Hispalis, 
presumably pro-Pompeian, were resettled by Caesar's troops 
(Bell. Hisp. 3.5). The charter of one of these resettled 
·colonies, Colonia Genetiva Iulia, at Urso (modern Osuna)
16 
has been preserved. 
In the regard to the extent of colonization and 
municipal grants, Caesar tended to favor Ulterior more than 
Citerior. Henderson numbers the Latin charters granted by 
Caesar in Ulterior as thirty-four and colonies as six, while 
17 
in Citerior only three and three respectively. Citerior 
had been more closely linked with Pompeius in the past (Caes., 
B.C. 1.61, 2.18) by his magnis beneficiis, and Ulterior with
Caesar (Bell. Hisp. 42; Caes. B.C. 2.21). Grants as a reward 
and encouragement for loyalty would naturally make this 
disproportionate balance. Sutherland proposes that Caesar was 
50 
attempting to unite the urbanized Baetis Valley with less 
18 
settled north and west coast regions. With military 
colonies in the North and civil colonies in the pacified 
regions, Ulterior would be easier to administer as a unit. 
"The true importance of Caesar is that he first 
exported Latium and the colonial system in bulk to transmarine 
19 
provinces ••• " From Dio (43.39.5) we find three types of 
grants: 
I ' , ''\ -1. _;t w f'L._ 1-(JL clTt.A£.Lr¥..- land confiscated from
Pompeians, as the colony at Hispalis, along with 
tax exemption. 
I 
2. 7t OAlTCLol - to individual and possibly also
municipia such as Emporiae.
20
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This statement in conjunction with the number of Latina 
21 
oppida found in Pliny (N,H. 3.7, 4.117) and the statements 
of Strabo on Baetica and Gallia Narbonensis (3.2.15, 4.1.12) 
leads to the conclusion that Caesar extended the ius Latii in 
22 
Spain. "The extension of Roman citizenship within the 
provinces is limited to areas where there is a solid 
foundation of Italian immigration, and that communities 
where the native element preponderated were favoured with 
23 
a grant of Latin rights rather than the citizenship." 
The granting of Latin rights to already urbanized 
settlements and the increase in the number of municipalities 
would augment the uniformity of administration, making the 
.51 
province as a whole easier to administer from Rome, while 
granting more local autonomy to the municipalities. Tax 
exempt status would free funds to be us�d in local growth, 
and the increase in local autonomy would free the municipal 
population from arbitrary or unresponsive policies at Rome. 
The widespread grants of the franchise would lessen the 
importance of its holder going to Rome, thus allowing 
the province to retain its most able politicians. 
The founding of new colonies, while immediately 
necessary as a reward to loyal troops, provided the province 
with new markets for goods, protection along the borders, 
and pacification and civilization in more unsettled areas. 
Their municipal governments, working under the duoviri 
system, would have provided an ideal for other communities 
to work toward. The charter of Urso provides some idea of 
the character of the administration in the municipal 
government probably along lines very similar to those of 
Italy. 
Were Caesar's actions taken in merely a "desire to 
obtain men, money and good-will in return for favors granted, 
24 
or by a genuine interest in the welfare ••• " of the province? 
Both motives would seem to be at work. The necessities of the 
political situ�tion dictated some of Caesar's actions. Troops 
and loyalty had to be rewarded; goodwill had to be insured. 
But the extent and organization of his grants indicated more. 
Sites for colonies showed that the interest in commerce 
or industry may have been noted. Tarraco, containing 
52 
a colony founded by Caesar, was a main commercial center 
on the land route to Italy and later became the capital 
of Citerior; Hispalis was situated on the farthest point 
25 
of the Baetis River accessible to large ships. The actions 
Ca�sar took were beneficial to all concerned. 
Whether Caesar's policy in the extension of Latin 
rights and the founding of colonies greatly improved 
the general economic growth of Spain is unclear. We cannot 
even be sure that Caesar's plans were complete when he died. 
Augustus• extensive reorganization of Spain overlay much 
of the work of Caesar, and source material for the intervening 
period is limited, but the fact that it was done indicates 
that Caesar's work was not extensive enough. 
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of Latin rights by Caesar and Augustus and M.I. Henderson, 
11Julius Caesar and Latium in Spain," JRSt XXXII (1942), 1-14
works with Pliny (N,H. J.6-JO; 4.110-118) to give some idea 
of the extent of Caesar's grants; G.F. Hill, Notes Q!l the 
Ancient Coinage of Hispania Citerior (New York: The American 
Numismatic Society, 1931) provides information on the 
status of individual towns. T. Frank, 111 Dominium in solo 
provinciali 1 and 'Ager publicus,111 JRS, XVII,(1927), 141-
16� discusses Caesar's view of state ownership of 
provincial land. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain 
shows the sites of municipalities at the time of Augustus in 
Map II. 
13. Van Nostrand, The Reorganization of Spain, pp.
101-102. C.H.V. Sutherland, QQ.. cit., pp. 95-100.
14. Van Nostrand, The Reorganization of Spain, p. 98.
15. Caesar, B,C. 1.86-87, 2.18-21; Livy, ]m. 110;
Bell. Hisp. 27,35. 
16. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, 6087; see
N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, .QQ. cit., pp. 420-428.
17. M.I. Henderson, QQ.. cit., pp. 11-12.
18. C.H.V. Sutherland, .Qn. cit., pp. 121-126.
19. A.N. Sherwin-White, .Qn. cit., p. 178.
20. The first widespread enfranchisement of Spaniards
occurred in 89 when a group of auxiliaries was rewarded for 
bravery before Ausculum. 
21. Thirty-eight; Agrippa's survey is generally
taken as source for Pliny. 
22. A.N. Sherwin-White, .Qn. cit., pp. 176-179; M. I.
Henderson, .Qn. ill., p. 10 n. 57. 
23. A.N. Sherwin-White, .Qn. cit., p. 170; Henderson
shows that the new citizens were enrolled in tribus Galeria; 
,2£. cit., p. 10 n. 57. 
24. Van·Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 103-4.
25. G.F. Hill, .Qn. cit.
4 
section on Tarraco; T. 
FranJ(. Economic History, pp. 3 8-349 also mentions the
commercial importance of Caesar's colonies at Corinth 
and Carthage. 
.5.5 
Conclusion 
The question we set out to investigate was whether 
Caesar exhibited an organized policy toward the economy of 
the Spanish provinces. Two distinct aspects have been 
considered: that of Spain itself and its economic growth and 
that of Caesar personally and his policies. 
During the first century B.C. the Spanish peninsula 
was exhibiting signs of the economic growth which reached its 
height during the first two centuries of Imperial times. 
Mining, industry and commerce were flourishing. Agriculture 
was becoming more diverse and profitable. Italian immigration, 
both of money and manpower, was providing an impetus to 
spur the growth which had been slowed in part due to the 
inconsistent and, at times, exploitative administration 
which the Republican Roman governors provided. 
As an aspiring young politician and general, Caesar 
found in Spain an opportunity to enhance his personal 
position. He, as proconsul following his praetorship, 
strengthened his dignitas and recouped his personal finances 
there. We have seen that he was adept at personal financial 
maneuvers, that he was greatly in debt, and that he did 
indeed exploit the situation in Spain to his own financial 
1 
gain. Badian calls him "the greatest brigand of them all," 
and it would seem rightly so. 
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On the other hand, Caesar was no Verres. He did 
exhibit a degree of concern for the provincials during his 
proconsulship and an understanding of both the economic 
situation and the consequences which his own authority 
could bring to bear. His debt settlement, though not 
innovative, was sound and beneficial to the province as a 
whole. The recension of the vectigalia freed money in the 
province. Caesar was a politician and we must not overlook 
the fact that these actions, while helpful to the province, 
were also extremely helpful to him personally. He became 
a patron of towns and individuals which surely aided him 
in his later career. What was good for Caesar turned out 
to be good for the province also. 
Did Caesar use his governorship to formulate principles 
of or a system for later economic measures? This seems 
unlikely. Surely his governorship in Spain proved educational 
in respect to handling a debt problem, but so far as we have 
investigated,the situation in Spain and that in Rome during 
his dictatorships were different. In both instances Caesar 
reacted to the situation and his measures were dictated 
by the situation. The only parallel between the two would 
be in an easing of the process of a creditor taking property 
of the debtor, if we accept Frederiksen 1 s lex Iulia de 
bonis cedendis. 
When Caesar returned to Spain it was as one of the 
contestants in a political power struggle that was to 
change the Roman world. It was not likely that he was 
2 
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unmindful of his position or·or the future. The steps 
that he took in extending municipal government seem to be 
a definite attempt to provide some uniformity of administration. 
Such a more expedient administration would surely have 
made the economic life more healthy. However, this does 
not seem to be Caesar's main consideration. While it is 
true that colonies were placed at times in consideration 
of their commercial potential, the main concern was the 
rewarding of loyal veterans. His municipal grants were 
merely a raising of the status of towns or areas which were 
already urbanized and ready for such action. I suppose that 
the question of Caesar's economic policy towards Spain 
might best be summed up in the words of T. Frank, "Julius 
Caesar's program was apparently not thought out in economic 
terms, and yet Caesar more than any other Roman statesman 
seems to have considered the economic aspects of his 
3 
political measures." 
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Footnotes for Conclusion 
1. E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic,p.78,
2. There is no inference from our sources that it
applied only to the Roman citizen in Spain. 
3. T. Frank, Economic History, p. 347.
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